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ISOLATION, LIMITED WAR, TOTAL WAR, 
CONTAINMENT, INTERVENTION AND PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES 
The more things change, the more they remain the same 
American public opinion and American policy with respect to committing military 
forces to combat or withdrawing them after they are committed, often exhibit a lead-lag 
relationship. Thus, when a proposed new (or changed) policy is ahead of public opinion, 
the task of the administration in power and congressional supporters is to educate the 
public as to why the change is necessary. The run-up to World Wars I and II are examples 
of an administration preparing the public for war. 
On the other hand, when a growing majority of the voters favor a major policy 
change, but one that is controversial, the pressure is on those opposing change. Such was 
the case with respect to ending the Vietnam War after 1968 and the Korean conflict after 
1951. 
When U.S. military forces are involved in a foreign war partisanship generally stops 
at the water’s edge. Public opinion insists that the country’s elected officials support the 
president and the men and women in uniform. However, the depth and extent of this 
support depends upon the circumstances leading up to the commitment. In this regard, 
public support for a declaration of war against the Empire of Japan was overwhelming 
after Pearl Harbour. The reasons for the conflict were clear and unambiguous. (1) Where 
goals were less clear as in World War I, support was correspondingly less. (2) And in 
regional conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where 
America’s self interest and ultimate goals were unclear, support was still less.(3) 
This paper reviews the background, debates and controversies leading up to the com-
mitment of American military forces in 20th and 21st century conflicts in the context of 
then existing U.S. foreign policy—isolationism, containment, and intervention. 
Isolationism 
In the 20th century, isolationism, here defined as “avoiding foreign entanglements” 
and conflicts, was the dominant theme in U.S. foreign policy till the Japanese attack on 




The aftermath of World War I, a war in which the United States and its allies were 
victorious, failed to change an American foreign policy that remained by and large isola-
tionist. This sentiment became apparent in the November 1918 elections, an election that 
focused on President Wilson’s war policies. The result was a Republican Party takeover 
of the Congress. The later defeat in the United States Senate of the treaty that would have 
made the United States a member of the League of Nations, if anything, hardened isola-
tionist sentiment. (4) 
In the 1930s isolationist sentiment clearly dominated U.S. foreign policy as seen 
with passage by the Congress of the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 1937, at a time 
when Europe was moving ever closer to war. 
In July of 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt failed to amend the 1937 Neutrality Act 
at a time when large Democrat majorities controlled the Congress. And in August 1941, 
his proposal to extend the length of service specified in the Selective Training and Service 
Act of 1940 from one year to 18 months, passed the House of Representatives by only 
one vote, 203-202. 
The cost of World War II to America in terms of lives and treasure and a desire to 
avoid another such conflict, insured its support for any arrangement/organization that 
might peacefully resolve disputes among nations, Thus, in 1945 it could be fairly said 
that isolationism, while not dead, would never again be the dominant force in American 
foreign policy. On July 28, 1945 the United States Senate vote for ratification of the 
United Nations Charter was overwhelmingly in favor, 89-2. (5)
 Limited Wars 
World War I 
Contrasted to World War II, World War I was a limited war with limited and unclear 
objectives. In essence, it was a 19th century war fought in the 20th century where the losers 
where forced to pay the winners in territory and reparations. (6) And while the Treaty of 
Versailles was clear on specific issues, i.e., how the Allies divided the spoils of war, it 
failed to address the long term issue of how to effectively deal with historic German 
militarism. 
Korean War 
To circumvent the Constitutional provision that only Congress can declare war, the 
Truman Administration characterized the conflict as a “police action.” And while the 
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contribution of military forces by United Nations member states to defend South Korea 
under American leadership helped militarily, it insured that there would be disagreements 
with respect to the conduct of the war and what would constitute an acceptable end to the 
conflict. (7) 
At the beginning of the conflict in June 1950 public support was, at best, moderate. 
The military and political strategies for fighting the war were almost immediately conten-
tious. As an example, the Republicans in the Congress favored bringing the Republic of 
China on Taiwan into the conflict. This was opposed by the Truman Administration and a 
number of World War II military leaders, the most vocal being “Vinegar Joe” Stillwell, 
who harbored a long standing animosity against Generalissimo Chang Kai Shek, then 
President of the ROC. 
In the Congressional elections of 1950 Democrat majorities were reduced in both 
houses of Congress. On April 11, 1951, President Harry Truman relieved General Dou-
glas MacArthur as commander of UN forces in Korea when the dispute between the 
President and General over attacking North of the Yalu River, i.e., China proper, became 
public knowledge. Following MacArthur’s dismissal, some Republicans in Congress 
called for a plural impeachment of the President and then Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson. 
In 1952 the public, frustrated by the Truman Administration’s inability to end the 
conflict, elected Republican Dwight David Eisenhower President. A truce ending the 
conflict was signed in 1953. 
Vietnam 
The Vietnam War was a classic example of a nation getting into a major conflict in 
small, incremental steps over a period of time, beginning with President John F Kennedy 
sending a handful of military advisors to Vietnam and his political attempts to broaden 
the base of the South Vietnam government. (8) 
If there was a year to date the beginning of American involvement in Vietnam it 
would be 1954. In May of that year the French stronghold of Dienbienphu was captured 
by Viet Minh resistance forces that had been fighting France for almost 10 years. (9) And 
although the United States had supported the French with funds prior to 1954, the 
Eisenhower administration never considered becoming directly engaged in the conflict. 
Following the French withdrawal from Indo China and failed attempts to form an 
inclusive national government, an agreement was signed in Geneva dividing Vietnam into 
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North and South nation states and at the same time recognizing Laos and Cambodia as 
independent countries. Also in 1954, lead by the United States, a treaty, the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), was signed by pro-western countries in East and 
Southeast Asia. Its purpose was to resist communist aggression in the region. 
Ten years later, following the assassination of President Kennedy, the Johnson admin-
istration made it quite clear that the United States would aid South Vietnam in its fight to 
remain independent, i.e., resist attempts by North Vietnam to unify the country by force. 
This assistance included funds, equipment and military and political advisors to the South 
Vietnam government as well financing various covert operations throughout the area. 
The defining moment with respect to America’s direct participation in the conflict 
came on August 2d and 4th 1964 when the Johnson administration alleged an attack by 
North Vietnam on two U.S. destroyers, the Joy Turner and Maddox, then on patrol in the 
Gulf of Tonkin. On August 7, 1964 the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed by Congress. 
Military action was approved “to repel any attack against the (armed) forces of the United 
States and to prevent further aggression. (10) The House was unanimous; the vote in the 
Senate was 88-2. A Harris poll published on August 11th showed a 14 point increase in 
President Johnson’s popularity. 
Over the next six years, the United States increased its involvement in the conflict by 
bombing North Vietnam and committing large military forces to fight alongside the South 
Vietnam army. But as in the case of Korea, there was no definite end game and exit strat-
egy. On the home front the war had become immensely unpopular, so unpopular that 
President Johnson announced on March 31st that he would not seek re-election. 
The 1991 Gulf War 
On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded and annexed its neighbor, Kuwait. Then President 
George H.W. Bush responded by initially deploying some 225,000 Army, Navy and Air 
Force personnel to the region. Later, large additional forces were committed. The United 
Nations Security Council condemned the attack and imposed a total economic embargo 
on Iraq. The United States, however, went beyond economic sanctions to lead a military 
coalition of Western powers, mainly Great Britain and France to drive the Iraqis from 
Kuwait. Other allied nations contributed token forces. Several, including Japan, contrib-
uted money. A number of Arab states sent troops to protect Saudi Arabia. The Soviet 
Union took a benign position with respect to America’s unexpected response to the Iraqi 
invasion, agreeing that UN action was necessary but also criticizing American forces 
buildup in the region. 
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America’s action was far from universally approved. Many Arab states openly con-
demned military action arguing that the Iraq-Kuwait dispute was an “Arab affair,” best 
solved by the Arab states themselves. Moreover, several Arab nations, e.g. Sudan, Libya 
and Jordan supported Iraqi grievances against Kuwait. Further complicating the diplo-
matic situation was the on-going “Palestine Problem” as between Israel and West Bank 
Palestinians. 
The Bush policy of militarily intervening in a Mid East war insured that the debate in 
the Congress over committing American forces to a large scale military action would be 
long and heated. 
On January 12, 1991, House Joint Resolution 77 authorizing military action under the 
1973 War Powers Resolution was passed by Congress; House of Representatives250-183, 
Senate 52-47. Later the Senate voted 97-1 for additional funds to cover incremental costs 
of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 
Following a short but intense air campaign, military success on the ground was swift 
and decisive. Iraqi forces were driven from Kuwait in a matter of days. However, Saddam 
Hussein’s vaunted Republican Guard was allowed to retreat back into Iraq in tact. The 
cease fire terms imposed a number of conditions on Iraq including “No fly zones” for 
Iraqi aircraft in the North and South parts of the country together with economic sanc-
tions. However, when all was said and done the (Iraq) government that had initiated the 
conflict remained in place. 
Total War 
World War II 
Total war implies total victory, not a conflict wherein truce or cease fire terms are 
negotiated. If this is granted, with the exception of the American War Between the States, 
World War II is the only total war in which the United States has committed military 
forces. And, as noted earlier, it was a war, not only supported at the beginning of the 
conflict, but one that was strongly supported by the public for almost four years when 
victory in the first years was a matter of faith and not predicated on battlefield successes. 
The defining characteristic of World War II when contrasted with other 20th century con-
flicts, is that, from the outset, goals were clearly stated. In other words, total victory 
meant nothing less than total victory. 
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Containment and Intervention 
Containment and intervention, in the case of the United States, are policies designed 
to avoid  the commitment of large military forces in a major conflict such as World War II 
without jeopardizing national security and national interests. Actually, containment and 
intervention are different sides of the same coin. In pursuing a policy of containment, 
intervention is often necessary. When intervention is undertaken, the stated goal is usually 
containment. 
To contain the expansionist plans of the Soviet Union after World War II, the U.S. 
intervened in Grenada, Nicaragua, Angola, the Congo Republic, Cuba, Somalia, and 
Afghanistan among lesser others. Containment was generally practiced by use of surro-
gate (usually local) military or para-military forces, extensive military and economic aid, 
and when advantageous, using various forums of public opinion. And while it might be 
argued that Korea and Vietnam were fought to contain communism, the casualties in 
these conflicts exceed the above definition, i.e., the use of minimum military force to 
achieve a goal. (11) 
Initiatives to contain the People’s Republic of China’s expansionist policies included 
maintaining a strong position in the Western Pacific, i.e., the U.S. Seventh Fleet, a Mutual 
Defense Treaty with Japan which allowed stationing of troops in that country, a Mutual 
Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea and  basing of forces in that country, and the 
Taiwan Relations Act which allowed the United States to sell defensive arms to that coun-
try and also implied that the United States would come to Taiwan’s assistance should 
China seek to conquer the island nation by force. 
America’s policy of containment has enjoyed success as well as failure with some 
results in between. Undoubtedly the most successful containment of Soviet ambitions 
following World War II was the U.S. lead North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
military alliance. As considered in this paper, peacekeeping operations are a form of 
containment.
  Pre-emptive Military Action 
Pre-emptive military action as defined by the American Century Dictionary is “(mili-
tary) action intended to prevent attack by disabling the enemy.” Two possibilities flow 
from this definition. The first is a “surprise attack,” i.e., no warning given to the targeted 
adversary. The second is a warning of pre-emptive military action unless specific condi-
tions are met. Note that in this option, while the warning is conveyed, the time of attack is 
not. Generally, pre-emptive military action is not dependent on a declared state of war. 
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Some examples of Twentieth and Twenty First Century actions include: 
Surprise Attack 
No clearly stated conditions presented by aggrieved nation that, 
having been met, would avoid attack 
*Germany’s invasion of Poland, 1939 
*Germany’s attack on Russia, 1941 
*Japan’s attack on the United States, 1941 
*North Korea invasion of South Korea, 1950 
*Egypt and Syria attack Israel, 1973 
*Israel air strike on Iraq nuclear facilities, 1981 
*Iraq invasion of Kuwait, 1990 
In all of the above surprise attacks, the attacking nation argued its security and/or 
national interests were threatened and hence the pre-emptive military action was justified. 
e.g. Japan’s assertion that its national security was threatened by the U.S. oil and iron 
embargo. 
Attack After Warning 
Clearly stated conditions, that having been met, 
would avoid attack 
*British attack on French fleet at Oran and Dakar, 1940(12) 
*U.S. invades Grenada, 1983 
*U.S. air strike on Libya, 1986 
*U.S. invasion of Panama, 1989 
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*U.S. lead coalition attack on Iraq, 1991 
*NATO attack on Yugoslavia, 1999 
*U.S. lead attack on Afghanistan (Taliban), 2001 
Conclusion 
There exists a latent isolationist sentiment in a broad section of the American public 
that is little influenced by the cliche that the United States is a world superpower or the 
only remaining military and economic superpower on the planet and as such must always 
play a leading role in solving world problems. 
When there is a clear and well understood danger to America’s national security, the 
public will demand military action if its leaders are hesitant, and conversely, will with-
hold support when the goals of a particular conflict are unclear and ambiguous and a 
strong case for national security is lacking 
When American forces are initially committed to combat, public support has two 
distinctly characteristics. First, support for the military is generally unconditional, i.e., 
what is needed to win will be provided at whatever the cost. Second, the public expects 
its military and political leaders to use every means at their disposal to end the conflict on 
terms favorable to the United States. When “less than favorable terms” are accepted, 
public dissatisfaction is made known at the ballot box. 
Pre-emptive military actions are not new. Surprise attacks and attacks after a warning 
is given have long histories. To its credit, the United States has never launched a surprise 
attack such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 194 but has taken a number of pre-
emptive military actions. 
On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by terrorist forces. Within 
hours of the attack, the United States declared war on terrorists and terrorist states world-
wide. And as in times past the public rallied in support of the President. And, as was the 
case in World  War II, the President promised nothing less than total victory in a war in 
which there was no end in sight. All sides agreed that the war on terror was a new type of 
war that would be waged by unconventional means. 
In the year following September 11th, military successes were achieved as well as 
failures. And as in past conflicts, it was only a matter of time until critics of the 




Bush’s stated purpose of requiring Iraq to give up its weapons of mass destruction, i.e., 
chemical, biological, and nuclear programs, by use of military force if necessary. 
There was, however, one thing that made the debate over how to disarm Iraq unique. 
It was the use of the terms pre-emptive strike and pre-emptive war. As would have been 
noted by long ago grammar school English teachers, they became “overworked words.” 
Critics of the Administration’s hard line toward Iraq seized on the words pre-emptive 
and pre-emptive war as if they had never existed  prior to September 11th 2001. For them, 
pre-emptive strike and pre-emptive war became pejorative terms indicating reckless and 
non-rational behavior. Pre-emptive strikes and pre-emptive wars were analyzed and com-
mented upon worldwide by the public, pundits, pollsters, and politicians. Those favoring 
pre-emptive military action were daily called upon to explain and defend their position. 
Examples of comments with respect to “pre-emptive strikes” and “pre-emptive war” 
include: 
*“Bush’s policy of pre-emptive war is immoral-such a policy would 
legitimize Pearl Harbour.” Helen Thomas, former Dean of White House 
correspondents and now a columnist for Hearst News Service (13) 
*The Bush (pre-emption) doctrine is a doctrine of pre-emptive war in the 
name of a new U.S. imperialism.  Senator Edward Kennedy,D-Mass. (14) 
*Pre-emption is a slippery slope that could easily lead to “a perpetual state 
of war to achieve peace.” Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies, 
Cato Institute. (14) 
*Bush’s pre-emption doctrine is “revolutionary.” It challenges a system of 
international sovereignty established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The 
treaty elicited the principle of non intervention in domestic affairs by foreign 
states. Even seemingly justified pre-emption “runs counter to modern interna-
tional law, which sanctions the use of force in self defense only against actual, 
not potential, threats.” Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary  of State. (14) 
Critics of the doctrine of pre-emptive military action are inconsistent in several 
respects. First, they generally agree with the concept of a total war on terrorism but not 
the means of achieving military success as practiced in the only total war the United 
States has ever fought, i.e., World War II. 
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Second, they ignore the many instances where America has undertaken pre-emptive 
military action, actions that were highly approved by the public. 
Third, they have failed to consider the lessons of past pre-emptive military actions. 
For while presidents usually enjoy wide public support at the beginning of a conflict, 
unless the conflict is relatively short and decisive, public support fades and sometimes 
becomes hostile. In this regard, recall the problems cited earlier of President Wilson 
(World War I), President Truman (Korean War), and President Johnson (Vietnam War). 
To believe that President Bush, or any president, could maintain any degree of public 
support for pre-emptive military actions absent a direct, well understood threat or attack 
on the United States, defies logic and history. It thus follows that a pre-emptive strike 
against Iraq (with warning), should it occur, can in no way be viewed as ushering in a 
new foreign policy that countenances pre-emptive military action at the discretion of a 
sitting American president. As the above review of history shows, presidents who exceed 
their military action mandates pay a high political price. A pre-emptive military “strike 
too far” would be no exception. (15) 
Addendum
    One might consider the consequences of a pre-emptive strike against Germany in 1936 
after it invaded the demilitarized Rhineland, an open breach of the Treaty of Locarno. In 
Hitler’s words: 
We had no army worth mentioning; at that time it would not even have 
had the fighting strength to maintain itself against the Poles. If the French 
had taken any action, we would have  been easily defeated; our resistance 
would have been over in a few days. And what air force we had then was
 ridiculous. A few Junkers 52’s from Lufthansa, and not even enough 




(1) Following Pearl Harbour, Congress declared war on the Empire of Japan 388-1 in the 
House of Representatives and 82-0 in the Senate. 
(2) When President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war against 
Germany and its allies in 1917, the vote, after a relatively brief but contentious debate, 
was: House of Representatives 373-50 in favor; Senate 82-6 in favor. 
(3) Opposition to the Korean and Vietnam Wars was largely fueled by a lack of a clear 
American goal, the so-called end game; mounting casualties with no end in sight, and 
with respect to Vietnam, the increasingly unpopular Military Selective Service Act of 
1967, an act perceived to discriminate by economic class of citizen. 
(4) A number of reasons are cited for the defeat of the Treaty. One was the arrogance of 
President Wilson in failing to explain to Congress and the nation his reasons for endors-
ing the treaty. A second was that the enforcement provisions of the treaty were unclear 
which led to fear that the United States could become involved in a war in which there 
was no paramount American interest. And last, the historical isolationist sentiment of the 
public, particularly in the American heartland. 
(5) At the end of World War II the United States became a founding member of the 
United Nations. Its influence in drafting the UN Charter is apparent. Remembering the 
fate of the League of Nations, the United States as a permanent member of the Security 
Council, can exercise a veto over a UN sponsored military action. (All other permanent 
members of the Council—Russia, France, China, and Great Britain have the same pre-
rogative) Absent this veto power it is highly unlikely that the United States would have 
approved the Charter. 
(6) Examples include: Great Britain received Germany’s East and Southwest Africa colo-
nies; Japan, German islands in the Pacific. The Ottoman Empire was broken up and vari-
ous areas put under League of Nations mandates. In addition, Germany was forced to pay 
reparations that history later showed it could not afford. 
(7) Disagreements occurred with respect to what constituted a successful conclusion to 




Unify North and South Korea by UN military forces? Attack Chinese forces north of the 
Yalu River, i.e., China proper after China committed large numbers of troops in support 
of North Korea? And with a cease fire, the contentious issue of repatriation of prisoners. 
(8) When the French withdrew from Indo-China in 1954, and successive attempts to 
create a national government failed, the country was divided into North (communist) 
Vietnam and South (Western oriented) South Vietnam. When it became clear that the 
North intended to unify the country by subversion and military force, the United States 
called upon the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to intervene in support of 
the South. Initially some support was forthcoming but as the conflict widened, this sup-
port was withdrawn leaving only the United States and South Vietnam to oppose aggres-
sion from the North. 
(9) The Viet Minh was the resistance group lead by communist military commander Ho 
Chi Minh. 
(10) Senator Barry Goldwater categorically stated in his autobiography, “Goldwater,” that 
an attack on the Turner Joy never took place and that there was a question as to whether 
there was an air attack on the Maddox two days later. He went on to say that the Congress 
voted on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution without all the facts of the event being known. 
(11) Korean War casualties, dead and wounded, were 140,200’ Vietnam, 211,556; the 
1991 Gulf War, 766. 
(12) On July 3, 1940, Great Britain demanded that French warships at Oran and Dakar be 
disabled by French authorities to the satisfaction of the British government or be engaged 
and sunk by the British fleet. Negotiations failed. British Vice Admiral Somerville with 
“Force H’ launched a pre-emptive strike at 5:54 PM. Four French battleships were put out 
of action. 
(13) MIT Tech Talk, November 6, 2002 published by the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Cambridge, Mass. 
(14) Yaukey, John, Gannett News Service. Bush’s pre-emption doctrine debated. Septem-
ber 16, 2002. 
(15) It could be reasonably argued that some critics of the concept of pre-emptive strikes/ 
wars are using the debate to covertly undermine other actions by President Bush that they 
disdain but are generally supported by the public. i.e., abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic 
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Missile Treaty with the Russian federation; refusing to accept the Kyoto accord with its 
present restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions; and refusal to accept International 
Court of Justice jurisdiction over U.S. forces deployed in foreign countries. In addition, 
President Bush has voiced opposition to several UN and European Union “worldwide” 
proposals that impact on American customs and security. e.g. the death penalty in capital 
cases. 
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